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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a system-of-systems framework to
address cyber-physical resilience, the ability to withstand
the combined presence of both cyber attacks and physi-
cal faults. This framework incorporates a definition of re-
silience, a resilience metric as well as a resilient control de-
sign methodology. The resilient control architecture utilizes
a hybrid optimal control methodology combined with a dy-
namic regulation market mechanism (DRMM), and is evalu-
ated in the context of frequency regulation at a transmission
grid. The framework enables the evaluation of both the clas-
sical robust control properties and emerging resilient control
properties under both cyber attacks and physical faults. The
proposed framework is used to assess resilience of a Cyber-
Physical Energy System (CPES) when subjected to both
cyber and physical faults via DETERLab. DETERLab, a
testbed capable of emulating high fidelity, cybersecure, net-
worked systems, is used to construct critical scenarios with
physical faults emulated in the form of generator outages
and cyber faults emulated in the form of Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. Under these scenarios, the resilience and per-
formance of a CPES that is comprised of 56 generators and
99 consumers is evaluated using the hybrid-DRMM control
methodology.
1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are physical systems whose
operations are monitored, coordinated, self-governed and in-
tegrated by a system of sophisticated computing and com-
munication algorithms. CPS not only permit but actually
mandate synergistic interactions between physical dynamics
and computational processes, with the rationale that wide
deployment of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICT) results in higher reliability and lower operational
costs relative to the traditional proprietary and closed sys-
tems. Such a deployment introduces new vulnerabilities in
the form of security threats due to cyber attacks. A specific
class of CPS that we focus on this paper is in the energy sec-
tor, which corresponds to smart grids [2], which are end-to-
end cyber-enabled electric power systems, from fuel source,
to generation, transmission, distribution, and end use.
Cyber-physical Energy Systems (CPES) are not only vul-
nerable to security threats but also physical outages which
may occur due to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earth-
quakes, and other unforeseen anomalies. A physical outage
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can be also caused by malicious human physical actions. An
example is the“Metcalf sniper attack”on PG&E Corp’s Met-
calf transmission substation in San Jose, California that hap-
pened in 2013 and caused a damage worth over $15 million
[38]. Given that the end-goal of CPES is reliable delivery of
power to its end-user at all times, cyber-physical resilience of
CPES is a necessary requirement, which corresponds to the
ability to withstand high-impact disturbances, which may
occur due to either physical or cyber causes, and continue
to deliver acceptable performance. In this paper, we pro-
pose a framework towards such cyber-physical resilience of
CPES.
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Figure 1: The most critical operating states of a
CPES
In order to ensure an efficient yet economic performance,
the states of a CPES are often organized into five modes,
normal, alert, emergency, in-extremis, and restorative [26]
(see Fig. 1). Depending on the mode that the energy system
is in, a corresponding set of decisions and actions is pursued
to ensure safety and desirable performance. Two points are
worth making regarding these five modes. The first is that
these CPES are typically designed to be robust with their
control and protection measures ensuring that they lie in
the nominal mode for the most part, and for any perturba-
tions that may cause a transition to the alert stage that a
suitable robust action brings the system back to a nominal
state. And those disturbances that trigger a transition to the
emergency mode, or worse still, the in-extremis mode, are as-
sumed to be a high-impact, but low probability event. In the
absence of cyber-attacks, while such an assumption is valid,
a combined presence of both physical and cyber anomalies
can significantly increase the probability of this transition,
as well as reduce the time interval of this transition. The
second is that the schematic proposed in Fig. 1 also sets the
stage for the notion of resilience and its distinction from ro-
bustness. CPES can be characterized as robust when they
are able to operate normally (which can correspond to the
case when the total electricity demand is fully served) under
disturbances that only cause transitions between normal and
alert states [43, 4]. In contrast, in the presence of high im-
pact disturbances, if the CPES transition to an emergency
state and further to an extremis state they can be charac-
terized as being resilient when they can return to an alert
or normal state within an acceptable time. A CPES system
must therefore be designed to be both robust and resilient, as
disturbances can have a range of impact, making the transi-
tion to any of the five states mentioned above equally likely.
Such a design principle is applicable not only to CPES but
any critical infrastructures such as transportation, water,
and healthcare [23, 25, 19]. Robustness of systems has been
investigated extensively over the past two to three decades
including several papers, textbooks, conferences, and jour-
nals by the controls community. And more recently, robust-
ness of CPS has been examined in [36, 31, 40]. In contrast, a
formal definition of resilience, either in the context of CPS or
systems in general, is yet to emerge. Broadly speaking, it is
widely accepted that resilience connotes the ability of a CPS
to sustain and recover from extreme and severe disturbances
that can drive the system to its physical operational limits
[26]. In contrast, robustness is a precisely defined notion
in control theory that denotes a property that characterizes
the system’s ability to retain normal operation after being
subjected to a range of bounded, and small disturbances or
uncertainties [42]. Clearly new tools for analysis and syn-
thesis of resilient control methods for CPES are needed and
are currently lacking. The goal of this paper is to exam-
ine cyber-physical resilience, and take a first step towards
developing a framework for studying this concept for CPES.
The framework that we propose includes a physical net-
work, such as a network of generators, loads, and transmis-
sion lines in a power grid, a communication network, that
is capable of transmitting information about the physical
and cyber variables to agents at various nodes, models of
classes of cyber attacks including deception and disruption
[27, 14, 8], an overall hybrid dynamic model of a CPES with
five modes that correspond to those outlined in Fig. 1, a
definition of resilience, a resilience metric, and a methodol-
ogy for designing a resilient control system for the overall
hybrid model. The framework is evaluated in the context
of frequency regulation in a power grid at a transmission
level. The resilient control system that we propose con-
sists of a Dynamic Regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM)
that carries out frequency regulation using a market-based
optimization framework, and a supervisory resilient hybrid
control layer. The main contributions of this paper are the
development of this framework and its validation using a
high fidelity testbed, DETER, that is capable of emulating
high fidelity, cybersecure, networked systems. DETER is
used to construct critical scenarios in the CPES where both
physical faults and cyber attacks are assumed to occur.
Very few studies have been carried out in the literature
that has focused on an end-to-end formulation of a cyber-
physical resilience control problem in a CPES. Notable ex-
ceptions include [43] where the authors follow a game-theoretic
approach for resilient control design. References [27, 14] and
[8] address models of cyber-attacks, but have not addressed
resilience metrics or resilient control design. In reference
[35], cyber security of power system is addressed through a
risk-based approach, but a detailed discussion of resilience of
a power grid against physical and cyber attacks has not been
provided. In contrast, in this paper we propose an overall
framework to evaluate cyber-physical resilience, propose a
resilient control method, and validate it using a high fidelity
testbed, DETER.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the prob-
lem statement and in Section 3 the proposed system-theoretic
framework for resilient CPS are presented, respectively. In
Section 4, a resilience analysis of a CPES with a Dynamic
Regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM) is conducted with
the Section 5 presenting a testbed validation case-study of
the CPES using DETER. Finally, Section 6 concludes this
paper with some remarks.
Figure 2: CPES with both physical and cyber layers
2. Problem Statement
An example of a CPES is a power grid with a communi-
cation layer, as shown in Fig. 2. The typical problem we
consider is one where a large physical outage occurs, which
then is followed by a cyber attack. An example of such a
physical anomaly is a generator outage in a transmission
network, which can lead to large frequency oscillations (see
Fig. 3). Depending on the extent of this outage, the overall
CPES can transition to either an alert or an emergency state.
Suppose that this outage is such that the latter occurs, then
typically load shedding is introduced, which ensures that
the CPES does not transition to in-extremis. But if at this
instance, a cyber attack occurs, then this transition indeed
can ensue, as shown in Fig. 3. Our focus is on such a com-
bination of events in this paper. In particular, the objective
is to identify how the CPES can be designed to function
satisfactorily despite these high-impact disturbances, i.e. be
cyber-physical resilient.
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Figure 3: Frequencies of IEEE 118-bus system buses
under a physical and a cyber outage
2.1 Models of Cyber-attacks
Malicious attackers can exploit protocol and network in-
securities to target energy CPS operations and markets. As
wide area energy CPS systems are starting to leverage exist-
ing Internet infrastructure, closed dedicated energy networks
are being replaced with standard open Internet protocols
and shared networks. These shared networks can be used
to compromise the three fundamental properties of informa-
tion in networked control systems, namely, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability [41].
Confidentiality concerns the concealment of data, ensur-
ing it remains known only to the authorized parties. Dis-
closure attacks enable the adversary to gather sequences of
data Ik from the calculated control actions uk and the real
measurements yk . The physical dynamics of the system are
not affected by this type of attack.
Integrity relates to the trustworthiness of data, meaning
there is no unauthorized change to the information between
the source and destination. Deception attacks modify the
control actions uk and sensor measurements yk from their
calculated or real values to the corrupted signals u˜k and y˜k,
respectively. The deception attacks are modeled as
u˜k , uk + ∆uk
y˜k , yk + ∆yk
where the vectors ∆uk and ∆yk represent the manipulation
to the respective data channels.
Availability considers the timely access to information or
system functionalities. Disruption attacks prevent the trans-
mitted data from reaching the desired destination. Such
attacks can impact the system by blocking the data or feed-
back signals, using denial of service attacks, replay attacks,
or zero dynamics attacks [27]. The Fig. 4 illustrates the
three categories of attacks and how they violate the security
properties. In all three cases, the physical plant is send-
ing a measurement vector yk = [7, 14]
T to the controller
through the communication network. This was intended to
be a private message to be known only to the plant and the
controller. All three forms of attacks affect this message in
various forms. In the example shown in Figure 3, a cyber
attack was assumed to affect the information sent from a
generator about its availability to an Independent System
Operator that plays a supervisory role in ensuring power
balance across an entire region. Due to this corruption, the
ISO carries out an incorrect economic dispatch, which in
turn leads to power imbalance and therefore a frequency de-
viation as illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Figure 4: Set point based cyberattacks on the com-
munication network: (a) data confidentiality viola-
tion by a disclose attack, (b) data integrity violation
by false data injection attack, (c) data availability
violation by a denial of service attack.
3. Systems-theoretic Framework for Resilient
CPS
In this section, we first provide a definition of resilience
in the context of CPS and present a hybrid systems mod-
eling framework for robust and resilient control design. In
addition, we provide a metric for quantifying the resilience
of CPS and formulate the optimal resilient control design
problem.
3.1 Definition of Resilience
The term resilience is being discussed increasingly of late
in the context of CPS, ranging from transportation [19],
power [1, 43], control systems [30, 29, 43] as well as other
types of systems such as ecological [17, 18] and biological
[23]. Resilience is often discussed concomitantly with other
system-oriented notions such as robustness, reliability and
stability [25] and quite often used interchangeably with the
term robustness. We argue however that these two terms
are distinct. The reason is that resilience and robustness
characterize fundamentally different system properties. As
mentioned earlier, the term robustness applies in the con-
text of small bounded disturbances while resilience, in the
context of extreme high-impact disturbances. We offer the
following definition of resilience:
Definition 1. Resilience of a CPS with respect to a class
of extreme and high impact disturbances, is the property that
characterizes its ability to withstand and recover from this
particular class of disturbances by being allowed to temporar-
ily transit to a state where its performance is significantly de-
graded and returning within acceptable time to a state where
certain minimal but critical performance criteria are met.
With this definition of resilience serving as the cornerstone
of our analysis, in the next section we introduce a CPS mod-
eling framework that enables robust and resilient control de-
sign.
3.2 CPS Modeling for Robust and Resilient
Control Design
In order to analyze and evaluate the resilience and ro-
bustness of CPS, as well as for performing resilient and ro-
bust control design, a suitable modeling framework should
be followed. In this paper, recognizing that CPS are fun-
damentally hybrid systems, we propose the following hybrid
systems modeling framework, inspired by that proposed in
[43], where a CPS can be modeled as:
xk+1 = f(xk, uk, wk, qk(xk, αk, dk, lk)), x0 = Rn (1)
where xk ∈ Rn, uk ∈ Rr, wk ∈ Rp are the state, the control
input and the deterministic disturbance vector at time k, re-
spectively. The variable qk ∈ Q denotes a discrete operating
mode and is parameterized by xk (state), by αk, that can
take any value among a collection of possible cyber attacks
A, dk ∈ D that models the possible physical failures, the
system operator’s action lk ∈ L. The complexity of a given
CPS and the way through which state variations, cyber and
physical failures or discrete control actions by the operator
can impact its dynamics, i.e its vector field f , will charac-
terize the function qk. The model (1) can be viewed as a
representation of not only CPES, but general CPS.
3.3 Resilience Metric
We now propose the following metric to quantify the re-
silience of a CPS described in (1):
R(xk) =
∫ k2
k1
[
J∗k − J(xk)
]
dk, R ∈ R+ (2)
where J(xk) is a function of the CPS state capturing the
system’s performance and J∗k is the time-dependent nomi-
nal performance that the system should meet, with R in (2)
representing the shaded area shown in Fig. 5 [37]. A few
points should be noted about the resilience metric in (2).
First, it naturally captures the performance degradation of
the CPS but also the time frame for which that occurs. Con-
sequently, the smaller the value of R for a given CPS and a
given set of critical physical or cyber failures [37], the more
resilient that system is with respect to these failures. This
implies that R in (2) is an appropriate resilient metric, since
a resilient CPS, is one which following a severe disturbance
not only does it experience very small performance degrada-
tion, ‖J∗k − J(xk)‖∞ but it also recovers back to the mode
Mode : q1
J(x)
k1 k2 time
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
J⇤k
k
Figure 5: Resilience metric
with nominal performance within an acceptable time i.e with
(k2−k1) being small. The performance of a CPS as the one
in (1) can be compromised in several ways. High-impact cy-
ber, physical disturbances or actions performed by the sys-
tem operator can cause the CPS to transit to new operating
modes by altering its structure and correspondingly its vec-
tor field. In these new modes, the new equilibrium points
xe can lead to J(xe) < J∗ i.e to performance degradation.
3.4 Optimal Resilient Control Design
With respect to the resilience metric defined (2), the op-
timal resilient control design problem can be now stated as
follows:
Optimal Resilient Control Design Problem: Given a
control input u˜k, a deterministic bounded disturbance w˜k,
a physical discrete disturbance d˜k ∈ D and a cyber distur-
bance α˜k ∈ A, compute a strategy l˜k ∈ L which is the
solution of:
minimize
lk∈L
R(xk)
subject to xk+1 = f(xk, u˜k, w˜k, qk(xk, α˜k, d˜k, lk))
x0, xk ∈ Rn, qk ∈ Q
(3)
Hence, the objective of the resilient controller lk is to min-
imize the performance loss R(·) while driving the system
back to its normal operating mode (with nominal perfor-
mance). On the other hand, the objective of a robust con-
troller would be to achieve optimal performance in each
mode qk in the face of a disturbance wk. A general solution
of the optimization problem that yields a resilient controller
is highly challenging. In the next section, we provide one il-
lustration of a resilient controller that approximately solves
(3).
4. Resilient CPES with Dynamic Regulation
Market Mechanisms
In this section, we address resilience of a particular CPES
using a Dynamic Regulation Market Mechanism (DRMM)
as proposed in [32, 33]. The DRMM is first described, and
how it can be used to achieve frequency regulation in the
presence of various disturbances. The supervisory hybrid
optimal control layer is then described.
4.1 CPES with DRMM
We begin by describing the particular CPES, which per-
tains to an optimal secondary control at the transmission
level. Described in more detail in [32, 33], the Dynamic Reg-
ulation Market Mechanism (DRMM), achieves frequency reg-
ulation in the presence of various physical disturbances in an
optimal manner. The starting point for this model is the de-
scription of the physical dynamics of a power system. These
are, the voltage angle δi and electrical frequency ωi dynam-
ics (swing dynamics) of the synchronous machines buses,
the voltage angle δi dynamics (swing dynamics) of the load
buses, the speed-governor valve position Yi dynamics of a
synchronous generator and its power output PM,i turbine
dynamics. Lastly, the power consumption PC,i dynamics
of the Demand Response (DR) resourses which are intro-
duced by latencies on their communication with the DR-
aggregator. Altogether, they can be compactly stated in
discrete-time state-space form as:
ψk+1 = Φψk + ΓBuk + ΓEPL,k, ψ0 ∈ R|ψ| (4)
where ψ = [ωTG δ
T Y T PTM P
T
C ]
T is the state-vector that de-
notes deviations of frequencies, phase angles, valve positions,
mechanical power generation and flexible consumption from
their equilibrium values, and Φ, ΓB , ΓE are constant ma-
trices. In (4), the control input is given by u = [PTG P
T
D ]
T
where PG = (PG−P∗G), PD = (PD−P∗D) are the secondary
control setpoints for the generators and DR units, respec-
tively. In the current practice today in power systems, only
regulation of the PG’s of the generators is considered at the
secondary control level and its objective is to regulate the
frequency of a balancing area back to its nominal value. This
is attained by designing the control input PG as an integral
control feedback of the area control error (ACE) which, for
an area β, is defined as a weighted sum of the frequency
error ωβ and the tie line error PT :
e
(β)
Ck
= B(β)ωβ +N
(β)
T PT,k = N
(β)
ψ ψk (5)
where N
(β)
T , N
(β)
ψ are constant matrices. The specific gener-
ators that participate in the secondary control and their cor-
responding regulation capacities are defined through a regu-
lation market which is cleared once every hour. Further, the
slow-varying set-points P∗G, P∗D are provided every 5 min-
utes by the tertiary level which solves an optimal power-flow
problem (OPF) in a real-time market setting. In contrast
to this practice, DRMM [32, 33] is implemented as an on-
going negotiation process between generators, DR units and
the ISO, that allows both generators and DR resources to
bid for regulation services in real-time while also ensuring
optimal allocation of these services. The negotiations are
realized through the iterative market dynamics stated be-
low which, via a Newton-like method, drive the market to
the solution of a modified DC OPF with objective the max-
imization of a Social Welfare. At the same time, through
an ACE signal into the power balance equation they real-
ize real-time optimal secondary control while additionally,
they guarantee energy payback of the DR units through an
additional energy equality constraint. The DRMM iterative
dynamics can be expressed as: [32, 33]:
Set-point dynamics
ξk+1 = ξk − aHˆ−1γ (pik +Nhλˆk) (6)
Multiplier dynamics
µk+1 = max{0, µk +Kµgk} (7)
νk+1 = Kννk +KEED,k +KηηD,k (8)
Auxiliary dynamics
ED,k+1 = ED,k +NEξk (9)
ηD,k+1 = ηD,k + ED,k (10)
Regulation signal dynamics
ρk+1 = ρk −KfNψψk (11)
where
pik = ∇ξfk +Ngµk +NEνk (12)
λˆk = (N
T
h Hˆ
−1
γ Nh)
−1(hk −NTh Hˆ−1γ pik) (13)
The vector ξ = [θT PTG P
T
D ]
T represents the set-points and
µ, ν the multipliers of the inequality and equality con-
straints, respectively. Moreover, the vector ED represents
the energy states of the DR units, ηD the integrals of these
states, ρ the regulation signal, pik a price response signal and
Hˆγ an estimate of the Hessian of the Lagrangian function.
Altogether, equations (6)-(10) can be compactly stated as:
ζk+1 = Aζkζk +Bρρk +BPL PˆL,k +Blg lg, ζ0 ∈ R|ζ| (14)
where ζ = [ξT µT νT ETD η
T
D]
T . The DRMM for each bal-
ancing area is executed as follows. The Independent System
Operator (ISO) provides the set-points PG,k and PD,k ob-
tained by the equation (6) to the generators and DR units
every ∆tk seconds. When they receive these set-points the
generators and DR units use their multipliers µk, νk to com-
pute their price response signal pik which they communicate
to the ISO. The ISO, updates the regulation signal ρk and hk
by computing the ACE in its area and finally, upon receiv-
ing all pik computes the next set of set-points ξk+1 with the
whole process repeating in the same manner. For a CPES
where the set of balancing areas is denoted by B, the phys-
ical, DRMM and regulation signal dynamics can be stated
as [32, 33]:
Physical Dynamics
ψk+1 = Φψk + ΓB
∑
β∈B
N
(β)
ζ ζ
(β)
k + ΓEPL,k (15)
DRMM Dynamics
ζ
(β)
k+1 = A
(β)
ζk
ζ
(β)
k +B
(β)
ρ ρ
(β)
k +B
(β)
PL
Pˆ
(β)
L,k +B
(β)
lg
l(β)g (16)
Regulation Signal Dynamics
ρ
(β)
k+1 = ρ
(β)
k −K(β)f N (β)ψ ψk (17)
Ultimately, the dynamical model of the CPES with a DRMM
can be compactly written as:
χk+1 = Aχkχk +Bχvk, χ0 ∈ R|χ| (18)
where χ = [ψT ζ(1)
T · · · ζ(|B|)T ρ(1) · · · ρ(|B|)]T ∈ R|χ| and
v = [PTL Pˆ
T
L l
T
g ]
T ∈ R|v|. The cyber component of the CPES
in (18) is due to the two-way real-time communication of the
set-points ξ and price signals pi among the ISO, generators
and DR units. In the next Section, we focus on designing a
resilient hybrid control law for the system (18).
4.2 Resilient Hybrid Control Layer of a CPES
In the previous section, we constructed the closed-loop
form of a specific CPES (18) with the discrete-time control
law defined through the DRMM. In this section, we focus
on the design of an optimal hybrid control layer for this
CPES. To accomplish that, we first recast the model (18)
in the form of a hybrid system as in (1) and use it to for-
mulate an optimal control problem. Let this CPES operate
in one of the five well-established modes depicted in figure
[12, 26]. We define the set of these discrete operating modes
by Q := {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5} where q1 corresponds to the nor-
mal state, q2 to the alert state, q3 to the emergency state,
q4 to the extremis state and q5 to the restorative state [12].
A qualitative description of these operating states and the
transitions among them is the following. CPES can transit
into an alert state (q2) when subjected to small state varia-
tions χ, to mild cyber α or physical anomalies d or to any
other actions performed by the system operator. In this case,
CPES can be characterized as robust when they are able to
continue operating normally, i.e. serving the total electricity
demand, in modes q1 and q2 without any performance degra-
dation and despite the reduced stability margins while even-
tually recovering from the alert (q2) to the normal (q1) mode
[26]. On the other hand, large state-variations χ or more
severe high-impact cyber α or physical anomalies d, or dis-
crete actions performed by the system operator l, can cause
power systems to transit into an emergency state where their
performance is degraded, i.e part of the demand is served,
while they experience overloads. We emphasize that, large
state-variations can cause discrete transitions to a CPES by
triggering other protection-type control switches. The series
of actions l that might be taken at this stage, any state-
variations χ or physical/cyber anomalies d, α that might be
incurred, will determine whether the CPES will move to an
extremis state (q4) where its performance is significantly de-
graded i.e a small percentage of electricity demand is served,
and it experiences even greater overloads, or it will return
back to an alert state (q2). Finally, the CPES can transit
from the extremis state (q4) to the restorative (q5) and then
to the normal operating state (q1) when the system opera-
tor performs appropriate control actions l. In summary, the
CPES in (18) can be in any of the above modes and can
transit between them by experiencing either state-variation
χ, exogenous disturbances d ∈ D (e.g tripping of a line),
Cyber-attacks α ∈ A or discrete-time control actions l ∈ L
which are performed by the system operator. We empha-
size that, by definition, these operating modes are generic
enough so that in reality they serve as a high-level descrip-
tion of the numerous other discrete operating modes that
the CPES (18) can actually operate in. Nevertheless, these
are sufficient for the scope of our analysis.
To capture the above complex dynamical behavior of a
CPES with the above operating modes, we use a hybrid
automaton. The specific example we focus on is frequency
regulation in a power grid at a transmission level. This
automaton, shown in Fig 6, can be described as the follows
[16]:
l
l
l
Mode : q1 Mode : q2
Mode : q3Mode : q4
Mode : q5
↵, d, l
↵, d, l
↵, d, l
 k+1 = f( k, vk, q1)  k+1 = f( k, vk, q2)
 k+1 = f( k, vk, q3) k+1 = f( k, vk, q4)
 k+1 = f( k, vk, q5)
Figure 6: Hybrid automaton modeling the Cyber-
physical Energy System (18)
Vector field
f(χk, vk, qk) := A
qk
χkχk +B
qk
χ v
qk
k , f : R
|χ| × R|v| ×Q 7→ R|χ|
Discrete operating modes
Q := {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5}, qk := qk(χk, αk, dk, lk) ∈ Q
Discrete transition mapping
φ : Q× R|χ| ×A×D × L 7→ Q
Note that, vk in (18) does not correspond to a control in-
put but to the inflexible load which can be controlled by
the system operator in emergency situations (e.g via load
shedding). Further, realize that, the operating mode qk ∈ Q
depends on the state-vector χk, the cyber-attacks αk ∈ A,
the exogenous disturbances dk ∈ D (e.g tripping of a line)
and any other discrete-time control actions lk ∈ L performed
by the system operator. For the above hybrid automaton
model, we proceed to define a function that captures its
performance over time. We start by noting that, the generic
resilient metric as defined in (2) represents somehow the per-
formance loss of a CPS over time that might occur due to
any kind of anomalies. In the case of CPES, their perfor-
mance loss has to reflect the number of customers (electricity
users) not served and/or the amount of electricity demand
not served, as well as the duration for which that holds.
With this in mind, let G denote the set of generators and Dr
the set of DR units and consider the following performance
function for the CPES in (18):
J(χk) =
∑
i∈G
P
(i)
M,k −
∑
i∈Dr
P
(i)
C,k (19)
i.e the total generation minus the total power consumption
from the DR units of the CPES (18). By denoting the vary-
ing inflexible electricity demand as a function of time with
J∗k , we can define the resilience metric as:
R(χk) =
∫ k2
k1
[
J∗k −
∑
i∈G
P
(i)
M,k +
∑
i∈Dr
P
(i)
C,k
]
dk, R ∈ R+
(20)
A resilient CPES should be able to serve the major part of
the electricity demand even in the case of emergencies while
also return to a state where it serves the full demand in
minimal time. The smaller R is, the more resilient the CPES
in (18) would be. Interestingly, in the context of CPES, the
resilience metric (20) has also a physical meaning, it denotes
the energy demand not served after a disturbance [37]. With
that, we pose the optimal resilient control design problem
for the partially closed-loop (secondary control is already
through DRMM) CPES (18) as follows:
Optimal Resilient Control Design Problem: Given a
physical disturbance d˜k ∈ D and/or a cyber disturbance
α˜k ∈ A, compute a strategy vector l˜k ∈ L which is the
solution of:
minimize
lk∈L
R(χk)
subject to χk+1 = f(χk, qk(χk, α˜k, d˜k, lk))
χ0, χk ∈ R|χ|, qk ∈ Q
(21)
In the next Section, we use the testbed DETERLab and
present a case study on the IEEE 118-bus power system
where, a series of physical d and cyber anomalies α take place
and the system operator is able to recover its full operation,
through a series of suboptimal but effective actions l.
5. Case Study
5.1 Attack Generation
The DETERLab facility provides a rich set of resources,
tools, and methodologies to conduct high-fidelity, large scale
network and cyber security experiments [10, 6]. This fa-
cility has been operational since 2003 and is operated by
USC/ISI and UC Berkeley. The main thrusts of research
on the testbed include cyber attacks and analysis, anomaly
detection in networks, and technologies to support privacy
and anonymity networks. As of September 2016, the DE-
TER testbed has supported 10,000+ experimenters and stu-
dents testing a wide range of cyber security technologies.
Using DETERLab for evaluation of CPS allows the exper-
imenter to replicate the interactions between the physical
and cyber components (plants, controllers, markets, etc.)
and the attackers with high-fidelity and accuracy, thus pro-
viding a unique balance between experiment control and
realism. The attack traffic can be generated using either
real–world attack tools or modeled attack tools provided by
the DETERLab facility. Several real–world attack tools are
available in binary or executable format and can be activated
on the required operating systems and end host configura-
tion. DETERLab also provides a range of DoS attack tools
that model the various attack methodologies, command and
control structures, attack volumes, and attack types, with
easy to use graphical user interfaces. There are several ex-
perimentation environments available to evaluate networked
controlled systems each offering different levels of fidelity
and scale [7, 24, 9]. Although these environments have their
own benefits, we believe that the DETERLab tools and fa-
cilities complement these efforts. In particular, it allows the
experimenter to closely replicate the real–world end host
and cyber attack models. This enables systematic and con-
sistent resiliency evaluation of physical control systems in
such environments.
5.2 Experimentation Framework
Figure 7: The IEEE 118-bus network overlaid with
a communication network (black links) between the
DR agents (green boxes) and the Generator agents
(green boxes) within the market.
In this section, we discuss the framework for integrating
the energy CPES semantics and market dynamics with the
DETER testbed to systematically explore the impact of dis-
ruption attacks on evolution and stability of such systems.
Our approach is to combine CPES and market dynamics
tools and simulation with DETERLab tools and methodolo-
gies for resiliency evaluations. We build on dynamic market
mechanisms developed in [32, 33], and develop additional
functionalities needed for security experimentation and test-
ing using the DETERLab facility. The DETERLab emu-
lation architecture is shown in Fig. 7 and has three main
components: the physical system dynamics, the physical-to-
cyber network interface, and the cyber network dynamics.
The physical system dynamics provides an interface to the
grid agent that computes the power flows and provides pri-
mary AGC control in the network. The physical to cyber
dynamics provides a mapping from the physical systems to
the communication network at the various agents within the
experiment. It is used to send and receive setpoints at the
demand response and generator agents over a TCP/IP net-
work. The cyber network dynamics captures the network
traffic on the shared network. All cyber anomalies are cre-
ated in this layer on the network.
Selecting representative topologies for the communication
network has been a subject of significant research over the
last several years. It is challenging since the Internet struc-
ture constantly evolves and deployed CPES systems rarely
make their underlying network topologies publicly available
due to security reasons [13, 7]. Additionally, the network
routing structure is also impacted by the link-level commu-
nication technologies, such as wireless, satellite, or wired
networks. For example, wireless mobile networks will have
a dynamic topological and routing structure that evolves
with the movement of the nodes while wired networks have a
static topological structure that does not change frequently.
The DETER testbed is primarily a wired testbed and of-
fers several topology generation tools and sample topology
catalogs for experimentation [11].
The traffic in the experimentation framework is deter-
mined by the various servers, clients, and attackers in the
network. To accurately model the wide-area networks and
the Internet, cyber security experiments typically model three
different types of network traffic; (i) background traffic, for
example, web server and web client traffic which is conges-
tion reactive, (ii) the foreground traffic that is under study,
for example, control traffic in the energy CPS and markets,
and (iii) congestion non-reactive traffic such as, attack traf-
fic in a DoS attack or traffic generated at some constant rate
from selfish and malicious nodes. These three types of traffic
are interleaved to create a complex set of dynamics discussed
in the next section. DETER provides a diverse set of traf-
fic generators, including Harpoon,TCP replay, Apache wget
clients for background and foreground traffic, and real and
emulated DoS attack traffic and other traffic generators [11].
Modularizing our framework as discussed above enables us
to rapidly evolve the cyber network and attack models and
the physical energy CPS models to accurately explain the
structural and functional improvements to the Internet and
address existing security threats, explore new threats, and
meet the challenges of scale and complexity. In the next
section, we discuss the specific experimentation scenarios
along with metrics for resiliency in the presence of faults and
attacks on the CPES in the emulated testbed environment.
5.3 Results
In our system, an independent system operator (ISO)
broadcasts set-points to each of the generators and demand-
response agents every ∆t seconds (in this paper ∆t = 2 sec-
onds). Upon receiving their set-points, each generator and
DR consumer responds to the ISO the power it can gener-
ate and the cost to generate the power. These quantities
can be thought of as the marginal cost or marginal utility
for each participant at the current set-point. Each gener-
ator and DR consumer is responsible for updating its own
value cost based on cost curves that are known locally to the
generator and demand response agents. The ISO is respon-
sible for measuring system frequency, calculating ACE, and
updating the generation of the collective system. Once the
ISO receives a response from all the generators and demand
response agents, the ISO has everything it needs to com-
pute the next set of set-points and the process repeats. We
emulate a period of 24 hours on the DETERLab testbed fa-
cility. We simulate the combined primary-secondary control
system on a 118 bus grid. We create physical disturbance
on the network which results in change in generation ca-
pability within the system. For example, faults could be
modeled as a rapid drop in renewable generation, a sharp
increase in conventional (inflexible) demand, or a genera-
tor tripping oﬄine. Our test system is a modified IEEE
118-bus test case, of which 54 are generator buses and the
other 64 are load buses modified with a certain amount of
flexible consumption. Each bus also experiences a conven-
tional, fixed demand PL. The system contains a total of
186 transmission lines. Unless otherwise specified, system
parameters are taken directly from the test files of MAT-
POWER. To analyze the resilience of the system, we run
Figure 8: The load shedding at buses 26-28 to ar-
rest the frequency dive and reconnection after lost
generation is restored
Figure 9: Generator 5 is removed from the market
which causes the frequency to be stable during the
attack.
two variations of a test. Initially the system is operating at
equilibrium when a physical outage causes the generators 11
and 12 to be disconnected as seen in Fig. 10. The frequency
starts diving rapidly and the system initially transitions to
an alert state. Then, the system operator sheds the loads
in the buses 26-28 (328 MW) as seen in Fig.8 causing the
system to transition into an emergency state. The system
operates in this state until, due to a cyber attack, Gener-
ator 5 loses communication with the ISO. This causes the
CPES to transition into an extremis state. As shown earlier
in Fig. 3, when this happens, the system is highly unstable
and the the magnitude of the frequency oscillations increas-
ing. As a resiliency control action, in the next variation,
we remove Generator 5 from the dynamic market and ob-
serve the system becomes stable again as seen in Fig. 9.
Finally, new generation is getting online and the lost load is
reconnected. These two resilient control actions enable the
system to transition from the restorative back to the normal
operating mode (see Fig. 1). In this case study we choose a
deterministic control action, first to load shed once genera-
tors 11 and 12 were lost and then to reconfigure the market
participation once generator 5 was under attack. Each of
these actions can be viewed, once again, as a suboptimal so-
lution of (21) for the transition from the in-extremis to the
emergency state.
6. Concluding Remarks
With the advanced sensing, communication and compu-
Figure 10: Physical anomaly: Generator 11 and 12
lose power
Figure 11: The total power generation shows loss
of generation within the system when generators 11
and 12 shut down and the cyber attack starts at
generator 5.
Figure 12: Frequency response under all three
events
tation components of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) inter-
twined with the physical components, CPS today are vul-
nerable to both cyber and physical faults. Consequently,
resilience with respect to failures, induced in both the cyber
and the physical worlds, emerges as a necessary aspect of
their secure operation. In this paper, we develop a system-
theoretic framework to address cyber-physical resilience that
includes a definition of resilience, a resilience metric and a
CPS modeling and optimal resilient control design method-
ology. The proposed framework is exploited to evaluate re-
silience of a smart Cyber-Physical Energy System (CPES)
under both cyber and physical faults through DETERLab, a
high fidelity simulations testbed for CPS. Critical scenarios
with physical generator outages and cyber Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attacks are constructed for a particular CPES
comprised of 56 generators and 99 consumers which adopts
our previously proposed Dynamic Regulation Market Mech-
anism (DRMM) [32, 33] at the secondary control level. The
resilience and performance of the CPES under these sce-
narios and a specific hybrid resilient control strategy are
evaluated.
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